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INTRODUCTION

For the past two years the Supreme Court of Florida has not been active
in the juvenile law area. During the past survey year, it has only decided one
case directly related to juvenile law.' On the other hand, the intermediate
appellate courts remained active as they have for the past decade. As they
usually do, the courts of appeal provide statutory interpretation of chapters
39 and 985 as well as oversee trial court evidentiary rulings in dependency,
termination of parental rights, and delinquency cases.
II.

DEPENDENCY

Under Florida law in a dependency proceeding, a party is defined as
"the parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the [Department of Children and Families], the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian2
ad litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child.",
Grandparents are not included in the statutory definition.3 Thus, where a
father petitioned the appellate court for writ of certiorari to review a trial
court order granting a motion to intervene by a grandparent, the appellate
court held, in J.P. v. Department of Children & Family Services,4 that the
grandmother was not included within the statutory definition of a party.5

*
Survey
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. This
covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2009.
See generallyE.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2009).
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(5 1) (2009); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.2 10(a).
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(5 1).
12 So. 3d 253 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 254-55.
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Therefore, she could not intervene.6 However,
Florida law does allow a
7
grandparent to intervene as a "participant.,
There are often situations where one parent is charged with dependency
and the other parent is viewed as non-offending. The issue of how the trial
court goes about evaluating the transfer of custody to the non-offending parent was before the court in T.S. v. Department of Children & Families.8 The
non-offending parent challenged the court order denying the Department of
Children and Families' motion to grant temporary custody to that parent.9
The court did so on the basis of the best interests of the child standard.' ° The
appellate court reversed, finding that under the FloridaStatutes, the court is
required "to place a child who is adjudicated to be dependent, as to one parent, with the non-residential parent upon request unless the court 'finds that
such placement would endanger the safety, well-being, or physical, mental,
or emotional health of the child.'". There having been no such showing, the
2
parent's appeal, viewed as a writ by the appellate court, was granted.'
Once children have been adjudicated dependent, and the parent is provided with a case plan and has substantially complied with it, "there is a presumption that the children should be returned unless it is [determined] that
returning the children would endanger them."' 3 The trial court's obligation
to make detailed findings regarding the relevant statutory standard for reunification was before the appellate court in L.J.S. v. Department of Children &

Families. 4 Florida law provides that in order to deny the motion for reunification, the court must find that if there was compliance with the case plan,
reunification would be detrimental to the children, by addressing six subfactors found in the law.' 5 The statute is mandatory in that the court cannot deviate from the statutory requirement and must make detailed factual findings
regarding the factors. 16 In L.J.S., the court had failed to make detailed factual

6. Id. at 255.
7. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50) (2009); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.210(b).
8. 992 So. 2d 299, 299 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 300 (citing M.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 777 So. 2d 1209, 1212 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); FLA. STAT, § 39.521(3)(b) (2009)).
12. T.S., 992 So. 2d at 300. As the court in T.S. noted, appellate challenges to non-final
trial court orders in Florida are often taken by writ of certiorari. See id.
13. L.J.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 995 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App.
2008) (per curiam); see FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1).
14. LJ.S.,995So.2dat152-53.
15. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.522(2), .621(10)(a)-(f).
16. FLA. STAT. § 39.522(2); LJ.S., 995 So. 2d at 1153.
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finding regarding five of the six factors. 7 The appellate court thus reversed.' 8
Under Florida law, a court need only make one order of dependency to
maintain jurisdiction over a dependency case as the order establishes a legal
status of the child for proceedings under the chapter.' 9 However, the court
shall order evidentiary hearings to determine whether there is a separate state
of events which also constitutes neglect.2 ° In P.S. v. Departmentof Children
& Families,2' the appellate court held that it was improper for the trial court
to enter a second order of adjudication of dependency as it maintained jurisdiction over the dependency case once the initial order adjudicating the child
adjudicatory
was entered.22 Thus, it remanded for entry of a supplemental
23
dependency.
of
order
second
the
reversed
and
hearing finding
As an evidentiary matter in dependency proceedings, the Department of
Children and Families (DCF), as the usual petitioner, is obligated to prove
one of the statutory grounds for dependency by a preponderance of the evidence. 24 In two recent cases, the appellate courts reversed on grounds that
there was not competent evidence for a finding of dependency.25 In the first
opinion, M.C. v. Department of Children & Families,26 a mother appealed
from a finding of dependency arguing DCF "failed to present competent,
substantial evidence [to establish] prospective neglect or abuse." 27 At the
heart of the Department's case was the allegation that the parent suffered
from mental illness and that there was a nexus between her psychiatric disorder and potential harm to the children. 28 The appellate court held that there
was no evidence, including expert testimony, as to "the existence, extent, or
nature of [the mother's] mental health problem," nor whether there were any

17. L.J.S., 995 So. 2d at 1153.
18. Id.; see also C.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 12 So. 3d 309, 310-11 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

FLA. STAT. § 39.507(7)(a).
See FLA. STAT. § 39.507(7)(b).

4 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 720.
Id. at721.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.507(l)(b).
M.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 993 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App.

2008); J.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 995 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
26. 993 So. 2d at 1123.
27. Id. at 1124.
28. Id. at 1124-25.
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negative effects caused by her illness upon the children's well-being. 29 There
was simply speculation. 0 The court thus reversed. 3'
In the second case, J.R. v. Department of Children & Families,32 a
mother appealed from an order adjudicating her children dependent alleging
insufficiency of the evidence.3 3 Specifically, the mother argued that "DCF
failed to present witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the allegations to
support a finding of dependency based upon abandonment. '34 The only direct evidence was from the mother and the only substantive evidence from
"DCF was uncorroborated hearsay evidence of an anonymous abuse report
stating that the children had been abandoned at the great-grandmother's
home."35 The appellate court reversed finding that "an uncorroborated report
and hearsay evidence is insufficient to support an adjudication of dependency."

36

Domestic violence is not only an important societal issue but it can be
grounds for a finding of dependency.37 In C. W v. Department of Children &
Families,38 a mother appealed from a trial court order adjudicating a child
dependent as well as a dispositional order withholding adjudication of dependency. 39 The basis for the proceeding was an allegation of an incident of
domestic violence in "which the mother allegedly choked the father while he
was holding the three-month-old child. ' 40 The father was also alleged to
have "slapped the mother during the incident."' 4' The Department alleged
that the "behavior demonstrated a wanton disregard for the presence of the
child and could reasonably result in serious injury. ,,42 Tefte
The father consented
to the finding but the mother did not.43 Florida courts have repeatedly held
that domestic violence can constitute harm when "it occurs in the presence of

29. Id.at 1125-26.
30. See id. at 1126.
31. M.C., 993 So.3d at 1126.
32. 995 So. 2d 611 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
33. Id. at611.
34. Id. at 612; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.604 (2009) (requiring personal knowledge for a
witness to testify).
35. J.R., 995 So. 2d at 612.
36. Id.
37. See generally Michael J.Dale, 2007-2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33 NOVA L. REv.
357, 357-63 (2009) [hereinafter Dale, 2007-2008 Survey].
38. 10 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
39. Id. at 137.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. C.W., 10 So. 3d at 137.
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a child." 44 However, the courts have also held that there must be more than
the child's physical proximity to the events in order to make a finding of
dependency.45 There must be an evidentiary showing "that the child saw or
was aware of the violence" that occurred and that the violence resulted "in
some physical or mental injury to the child. 46 In the C.W. case, "the trial
court made no findings that the three-month-old child was aware of the incident or was physically or mentally harmed. 47 Nor was there any evidence
that the infant comprehended the incident. 48 The appellate court thus ruled
that absent "any evidentiary finding that the child appreciated or suffered any
physical or mental injury" or an evidentiary finding that the parent "posed a
current threat of harm to the child, the ...court's finding of dependency
[could not] stand. 4 9 The court thus reversed.5 °

The failure of the Department of Children and Family Services to
comply with Florida's dependency statutes when interacting with parents is
reported regularly in the appellate case law. In C.J. v. Department of Children & Family Services,51 a parent appealed from an order adjudicating the
child dependent. 52 The district court of appeal affirmed. 53 However, it spoke
at length about the actions of the Department in the case.54 The appellate
court found that the Department violated the spirit as well as the letter of the
statute, worked at cross purposes with the mother, was in an adversarial relationship with the mother, and distorted the matter in which the goals of chapter 39 ought to be pursued. 55 In sum, the court said "[t]he actions and attitudes displayed by the Department in this case are ones we cannot and do not
condone.56 Nonetheless, on the facts of the case, the court affirmed.57

44. Id. at 138 (citing R.V. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 939 So. 2d 200, 202
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); M.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 937 So. 2d 709,
710-11 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); D.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 615,
617 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 357.
45. C.W., 10 So. 3d at 138; R.V., 939 So. 2d at 202; M.B., 937 So. 2d at 711; D.D., 773
So. 2d at 617-18; Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 357-58.
46. C.W., 10 So. 3d at 138.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 139.
50. Id.
51. 9 So. 3d 750 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
52. Id. at 751.
53. Id. at 756.
54. See id. at 750-56 (describing the actions of the Department).
55.
d.at 756.
56. C.J., 9 So. 3d at 756.
57. Id.
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TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Among the grounds for termination of parental rights (TPR) in Florida
is incarceration of the parent.58 The relevant statute provides that the termination is authorized when "the period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of
time before the child will attain the age of 18 years." 59 The appellate courts
have dealt on a number of occasions with questions of just what the term
"substantial portion" means. In J. W.B. v. Department of Children & Families,6° a father who was incarcerated appealed from an order terminating his
parental rights.61 The appellate court found that the father had been incarcerated since the child's birth, had never seen the child or provided financial
support, and was scheduled to be released from prison when the child was
approximately twelve years of age.62 The court relied on a Supreme Court of
Florida ruling in which the court applied a percentage to determine a substantial portion of time.63 Applying that test, the court in J.W.B. found that
the percentage was sixty percent of the time before the child turned eighteen
and thus, together with other factors of noninvolvement by the parent, affirmed.64
In S.H. v. Department of Children & Family Services,65 DCF filed an
amended petition to terminate parental rights "when the children, who included twins, were two, three, and four years old."'66 When the parent was to
be released from prison, the children would be eight, nine, and ten.67 Recognizing that the time factor was incarceration in the future and not the time the
parent had been incarcerated in the past, and finding further that precedent
suggested that an eight year incarceration did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of incarceration for a substantial period of time, the court
reversed.68

58. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(l)(d) (2009).
59. Id.
60. 8 So. 3d 1191 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
61. Id. at 1192.
62. Id. at 1193.
63. Id. at 1192 (citing B.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Fla.
2004)).
64. Id. at 1193.
65. 992 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
66. Id. at317.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 317-18 (citing B.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So. 2d 1046, 1055
(Fla. 2004) (per curiam); J.P.C. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 819 So. 2d 264, 266
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
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A second ground for termination of parental rights in Florida, as is the
case in other jurisdictions, is abandonment. 69 Abandonment is defined in
chapter 39 and, as most recently amended, provides that the parent "makes
no provision for the child's support and has failed to establish or maintain a
substantial and positive relationship with the child., 70 This includes frequent
regular contact with the child and exercising parental responsibility. 7' Marginal efforts are not enough.72 The issue before the appellate court in T.G. v.
Department of Children & Families,73 was whether termination was appropriate on abandonment grounds, where included among the factual information was the fact that the mother "failed to visit [the children] for over a year
prior to the final hearing."74 Mississippi's law includes a one year time
frame and Missouri's a six month time frame.75 The court applied the one
year time period as well as other facts presented to the trial court and affirmed the termination.76
Another ground for termination of parental rights in Florida is when
there is abuse of a sibling and a nexus is found between abuse of the sibling
77
and the prospective abuse of the child who is the subject of the proceeding.
In addition, in any termination of parental rights case, the court must also
find that the manifest best interests of the child requires termination and that
termination is in the child's best interests. 78 In T.L. v. Department of Children & Family Services,79 a father appealed from termination of parental
rights because the trial court failed to base its decision "on evidence demonstrating that the [f]ather posed a threat of prospective harm to" the child, but
instead terminated parental rights because it thought that "offering services
to the [f]ather would result in an unwarranted delay in achieving permanency

69.
70.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 39.806(1)(b) (2009).
§ 39.01(1).

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 8 So. 3d 1198 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
74. Id. at 1199.
75. Id. at 1199-1200 (citing In re A.M.A., 986 So. 2d 999, 1010 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007),
cert. denied, 987 So. 2d 451 (Miss. 2008); In re J.W., 11 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999)).
76. Id. at 1200.
77. See A.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 870 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2004). The nexus issue also comes up in dependency cases. See Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 363-64. As to the nexus test in TPR cases, see Michael J. Dale, 20052006 Survey of Juvenile Law, 31 NOVA L. REv. 577, 594-95 (2007) [hereinafter Dale, 20052006 Survey].

78.
79.

FLA. STAT. § 39.810(2009); G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 973 (Fla. 1995).
990 So. 2d 1267 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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for the child., 80 The appellate court held that the trial court was correct in
finding that there had been egregious abuse by the father of the sibling of the
child who was before the court for failing to take appropriate steps to obtain
necessary care for the other child. 8' However, there was no competent evidence of the nexus requirement in the sense of a "predictive relationship between the past abuse of the injured child" and prospective abuse of the sibling before the court as required under Florida law. Specifically, the trial
court had before it no psychological assessment that would show "that the
[f]ather lacked self-control," had a drug addiction problem, or suffered from
''a mental or emotional condition" that would produce the nexus between the
injury to the sibling and the threat of prospective harm to the child.83 Finally,
the appellate court found that "there was no evidence that the [f]ather would
not benefit from court-ordered services," and thus the trial court failed to
84
show that termination was the least restrictive means to protect the child.
The appellate court thus reversed.
Evidentiary issues arise in TPR proceedings just as they do in dependency matters. In F.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services,86 both
the Department of Children and Family Services and the Guardian ad Litem
Program, as parties to the proceedings, conceded "the court's termination
order [was] legally insufficient because it contain[ed] only a conclusory
statement that termination of ...parental rights would be in the manifest best
interests of the child. 87 However, the appellate court also reversed based on
insufficient evidence.8 8 The issue which the court discussed was hearsay.89
At the termination hearing, the trial court took judicial notice 9 of a file
which contained shelter documents, orders of the court including the dependency judgment and the case plan. 9' It also "contained an assessment of the
child" which the mother had "reported to have said that [the father] refused
to acknowledge paternity. '92 Inexplicably, the father's lawyer "did not make
80. Id. at 1270.
81. Id. at 1272.
82. Id. (citing K.A. v. Dep't of Children & Family Services, 880 So. 2d 705, 709 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
83. Id. at 1273.
84. T.L., 990 So. 2d at 1273.
85. Id.
86. 4 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
87. Id. at 685.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 686.

90.

See FLA.

91.
92.

F.B., 4 So. 3d at 686.
Id.

STAT.

§§ 90.202, .203 (2009).
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any hearsay objections to the documents encompassed within the request for
judicial notice," according to the appellate court. 93 More apparent was the

objection to an improper request for judicial notice under the Florida Rules
of Evidence although there is no reference to that in the opinion. Despite
these failures to object, the appellate court held that "the Department failed
to show by clear and convincing evidence that [the father] was able [to] but
failed to provide for the child" under the abandonment provision of chapter
39 of the Florida Statutes.95 The court found that the only evidence presented by the Department was hearsay and thus inadmissible, and the only
competent evidence was that of the father who claimed "he had never denied
paternity and that he had tried without success to locate the mother." 96 The
appellate court therefore reversed. 97
The second evidentiary opinion at the TPR stage is M.E. v. Department
of Children & Families.98 In M.E., the appellate court applied the clear and

convincing evidence standard in reversing the finding of termination of parental rights. 99 It did so because the trial court had "found the evidence
troubling" because of gaps of proof including a lack of any evidence or
records of "any mental health professional treating [the] appellant" parent.' °°
It also found "'obvious' errors in the testimony of the 'only professional'
who testified and a 'certain vagueness even on subjects where the [professional] appeared to be reasonably accurate."" 0 ' The appellate court reversed
because it found that the trial court "was not convinced without hesitancy
that the evidence warranted the termination of appellant's parental rights,"
and thus the appellate court could not "say that competent, substantial evidence support[ed] the court's finding that the evidence was clear and convincing."' 2
During the course of child welfare proceedings, including dependency
matters and TPR cases, a child's placement may be changed under Florida
law.'0 3 However, the test for that change is one of the child's best interests. " Florida law further states that when the child is first placed with the
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

id.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.201-.204.
Id. at 686-87; see FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(1), .809(1) (2007).
F.B., 4 So. 3d at 686.
Id. at 687.
1 So. 3d 268 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2009).

99.
100.

Id. at 268-69; see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
M.E., I So. 3d at269.

101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.521 (2009).

104.

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.521 (1)(b)(1), (1)(d)(8)(b).
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Department because there is no suitable relative, there is no obligation to
later place the child with a relative "if it is in the child's best interest to remain in the current placement."10 5 In GuardianAd Litem Programv. R.A.,'°6
the guardian ad litem (GAL), according to the court, appealed from "an order
granting [the] father's motion to change the placement of his daughter" from
the foster parent's home to that of the grandmother.10 7 While the appellate
court describes the matter as an appeal by the guardian ad litem, it would
appear, given the caption of the case, that the appeal was by the Guardian Ad
Litem Program, 1 8 as the Guardian Ad Litem Program was a party to the proceeding pursuant to chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes.'°9 When the trial
court ordered a transfer of placement, the Guardian Ad Litem Program appealed. 0 Treating the matter as a non-final order and thus describing the
appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, the appellate court reversed.'
Finding that the evidence at the trial level was that it was in the child's best
interest to remain in the current foster home, the court reversed concluding
that the trial court failed to follow the
clear statutory directions which were
2
based upon a best interest standard.'"
In 2004, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Florida Department of
Children & Families v. F.L., 13 which held that in an involuntary termination
of parental rights case, the Department must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that there was a substantial risk of significant harm to the child before the court then decides whether termination of parental rights "'is the
least restrictive means of protecting the child from ... harm.' 1 4 Application of the F.L. test was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in J.J. v.
Department of Children & Families.15 The appellate court first found that
the trial court in J.J.made a series of errors by basing termination of parental
rights in part on testimony that a parent failed to admit abuse, and that the
parent lacked financial resources to provide for the child, as well as failing to
105. FLA. STAT. § 39.521(l)(d)(8)(b).
106. 995 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
107. Id. at 1083.
108. See id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(5 1).
110. R.A., 995 So. 2d at 1083.
111. Id. at 1084 n.1, 1085. As to the proper method for raising an appeal from a non-final
order, see FLA. R. App. P. 9.040(b)(2)(C); R.J. v. Guardian Ad Litem Program, 993 So. 2d
176, 177 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
112. R.A.,995So.2dat1083-84.
113. 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam).
114. Id. at 608 (quoting Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d
565, 571 (Fla. 1991)).
115. 994 So. 2d 496, 501 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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"include the passage of time and positive changes in a parent's circumstances." ' 16 Finally, the appellate court concluded that DCF had expedited
termination of parental rights, "did not offer the mother a case plan for the"
children before the court, "did not obtain a psychological evaluation of the
mother to assist the court," and thus failed to offer opportunities to the mother to prove her ability to care for the children.' 17 Failure to do so showed that
there was a failure to prove that termination
of parental rights was the least
18
restrictive means to assist the parent."
The least restrictive means test in the termination of parental rights cases was also before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in C.A.T. v. Department
of Children and Families."9 In that case, "[t]he father was not offered a case
120
plan for reunification prior to initiation of the.., termination proceeding."'
In an earlier dependency case involving the child who was the subject of the
TPR proceeding, the father had been found to be non-offending despite the
fact that he had refused a case plan. 121 In fact, he had not received any services from DCF "since his participation in the original case plan in 2002" in
a prior proceeding. 22 In the TPR proceeding, "he was never offered a case
plan with services as an alternative to losing his parental rights in the current
proceeding[]." 23 Of course under Florida law, DCF does not have to provide
a case plan for reunification.' 24 DCF can show that the parent will not benefit from court-ordered services. 125 Because the Department did not prove
"that the father was not amenable to remedy
his problems through actual,
126
reversed.
court
the
services,"
appropriate
In addition, however, in dicta, the court noted that the father was not "a
model parent."'127 Judge Sawaya, writing for the court, then made the following statement:
We are not aware of a precise definition that tells us what a model
parent is. Perhaps it is nothing more than a mythical figure, much

116. Id. at 502.
117.
118.

Id. at 503.
Id.

119.

10 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 684.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See CA.T., 10 So. 3d at 684;

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.806(3) (2009).

125. See, e.g., T.L. v. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 990 So. 2d 1267, 1273 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2008).

126.
127.

C.A.T., 10 So. 3d at 685-86.
Id.at 685.
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like the reasonable person in tort law, that good parents should
seek to emulate. Although it may be inescapable that many will
assume that mothers and fathers may not be model parents if DCF
has intervened in their lives to protect their child[ren] from harm,
the law does not profess to require parental perfection. Indeed, the
provisions contained in chapter 39 reveal an acute awareness that
many parents, like the father in the instant case, are in need of assistance to achieve the necessary skills to simply be adequate
par28
ents who do not harm, neglect or abuse their children.'
The issue of whether ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be
made in TPR proceedings remains undecided in Florida. 129 The issue was
raised again during this survey year in L.H. v. Department of Children &
Families.130 The Fifth District Court of Appeal referred to the last reported
opinion in the area, E.T. v. State, Department of Children & Families,13' decided by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 2006, and recognized that the
Supreme Court of Florida has still not ruled on this issue having "referred
[the] issue to the Juvenile Court Rules Committee and the Appellate Court
Rules Committee for consideration.' ' 32 The appellate court in L.H. also recognized that trial and appellate courts around the country struggled with the
issue, and encouraged the Supreme Court of Florida and the committees "to
provide guidance on this important issue." 133 On a motion for rehearing,
clarification and certification, the district court of appeal certified the question of recognition of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel to the Supreme Court of Florida."3
The issue of a parent's nonappearance at a termination of parental rights
proceeding has come up regularly before the appellate courts. 3 5 Florida law
provides that the failure to personally appear can constitute consent to terminate parental rights. 136 The issue arose again in L.S. v. Department of Child128.

Id.

129. See E.T. v. State, Dep't of Children & Families, 930 So. 2d 721, 729 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
130. 995 So. 2d 583, 583-84 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
131. 930 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
132. L.H., 995 So. 2d at 584 (citing E.T. v. State, 957 So. 2d 559, 599 (Fla. 2007) (per
curiam)).
133. Id. at 585. See also I MICHAEL J. DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, §
4.06[l][c] (2009).
134. LH., 995 So. 2d at 585. See also Dale, 2005-2006 Survey, supra note 77, at 599;
Michele R. Forte, Making the Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary Termination of ParentalRights Proceedings,28 NOVA L. REV. 193, 194-95 (2003).
135. See Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 371.

136.

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.801(3)(a)(7) (2009).

20091

2009 SURVEY OFJUVENILE LA W

ren & Family Services. 37 In this case, the mother argued on appeal "that the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow her to appear by telephone to explain her absence from the adjudicatory hearing" and concluding
that "her nonappearance [was] consent to the termination of her parental
rights.' ' 38 The appellate court agreed and reversed. 39 The mother's counsel
did appear "at the scheduled adjudicatory hearing and informed the court that
the mother was out of state and unable to personally appear because of financial difficulties."'
The counsel further "advised the court that the mother
was available to appear by telephone" and that she should be given that opportunity to explain why "she was unable to appear in person.'' Both DCF
and the guardian ad litem (GAL) objected. 142 Specifically the GAL said that
"'there's a history here of the mother not showing, and I think this is just
indicative of a pattern.' ' 1 43 The appellate court held that the GAL statement
"was disputed at the hearing by the mother's counsel and [was] not supported by the record."' 44 Under these circumstances, the appellate court reversed concluding "the trial court should have allowed the mother the opportunity to appear by telephone' 45to explain the reasons for her nonappearance
instead of entering a default."'
In a second consent to TPR case, J.M. v. Department of Children &

Families,'46 although the court had warned the parent at three prior hearings
that "her failure to attend the adjudicatory hearing would constitute consent
to the petition," at the hearing when the court continued the matter for a third
time, it "failed to advise the mother that she must personally appear at the
reset date.' ' 147 She did not appear, sending "word that she was attending [to]
matters regarding the recent death of her father."'' 48 However, although never
moving to vacate the consent, the mother then did participate with the approval of the court on the further days of the proceeding. 49 The trial court
found that the DCF had proved termination by clear and convincing evi137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

995 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 517.

144.

Id.

145.
issue).
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
L.S., 995 So. 2d at 517.

Id.
Id.; see Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 371 (collecting case law on this
9 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).

147.

See id. at 36.

148.
149.

Id.
Id.
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dence."5 ° The appellate court thus ruled that the failure "to order the mother
to appear on the hearing date at which the adjudicatory hearing actually
commenced" was an "oversight" and thus "the court should not have entered
a consent to the petition. '1 5 ' However, the court did not reverse because the
mother was given a full opportunity to participate
in the proceeding and the
52
court ruled that DCF had met its burden.
Florida's law regarding who is a party to a dependency in a termination
of parental rights case is expansive. 5 3 It includes "the parent or parents of
the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child."'' 54 In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the
individuals who may appeal under Florida law are "[a]ny child, any parent or
guardian ad litem of any child, any other party to the proceeding who is affected by an order of the court, or the department."1 5 5 Thus, a review of recent reported appellate opinions shows that parents, the Department, and the
Guardian ad Litem Program regularly appeal. In R.H. v. Department of
Children & Family Services, 156 the child's grandparents, who were not parties to the proceeding below, sought to challenge the trial court order modifying placement of the granddaughter whose parents' parental rights had been
terminated, and which order placed the child "in the temporary legal custody
of her paternal aunt and uncle.' ' 157 Reviewing the statutes in question concerning party status at the trial level and on appeal, the appellate court ruled
that the grandparents lacked standing to challenge the order on appeal.158
IV.

SURRENDER OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

While most case law concerns involuntary termination of parental
rights, a parent may voluntarily surrender parental rights pursuant to chapter
150. Id.
151. J.M., 9 So. 3d at 36.
152. See id. at 36-37.
153. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2009).
154. Id. Despite the statutory references to the Guardian ad Litem Program as a party to a
proceeding in chapter 39, both the Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal have raised the
issue of the Guardian ad Litem Program's standing as a party. See Dep't of Children & Families v. S.T., 963 So. 2d 314, 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cole, 574 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
155. FLA. STAT. § 39.815(1).
156. 994 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
157. Id.atl154.
158. Id. at 1154-55 (citing C.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 981 So. 2d 1272, 1272
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008); D.M. v. State, Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 980 So. 2d
498, 498 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
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39 of the Florida Statutes.1 59 The proper procedure for doing so was before
the Fifth District Court of Appeal in R.B. v. Department of Children & Families.'6° A mother appealed "an order denying her motion to set aside the surrender of her parental rights to her two children. ' 16' After her two children
were removed and sheltered and at an arraignment hearing, there was a representation that the mother was interested in signing paperwork to surrender
parental rights.1 62 After conferring with her counsel, the mother was "placed
under oath and signed the 'Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender of
Parental Rights, Consent, and Waiver of Notice' forms" which were witnessed by counsel and a bailiff.163 Because the mother's counsel suggested
to the general master that his client "had indicated she might be mentally
unstable .... the general master asked several pertinent questions. ' ' 164 The
master found that the surrender was "knowingly, freely, and voluntarily executed;" and the trial court accepted it. 165 "Five months later, with new
counsel," the mother moved to set aside the voluntary surrender.' 66 The appellate court found, first, that the general master had authority to '"administer oaths and conduct hearings' [and thus] inherently had the power to take
acknowledgment"; and, second, that there was no showing of fraud or duress. 167 The appellate court noted that the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to vacate
the surrender rests on the parent. 168 The appellate
69
1
court thus affirmed.
V.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Once a court in a juvenile delinquency case holds an adjudicatory hearing and finds that the child has committed an act, which if committed by an
adult would be a crime under chapter 985, the court proceeds to a dispositional hearing.' 70 States differ as to the degree of discretion that the juvenile
court has in making a disposition. 17 Florida's dispositional statute contains a
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(a).
997 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 1217.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R.B., 997 So. 2d at 1217.
Id.
Id.at 1217-18.
Id. at 1218.
Id.
FLA. STAT. §§ 985.35, .43 (2009).
1 DALE, supra note 133, at § 5.03[13][a].
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list of alternatives and further provides that the Department of Juvenile Jus17 3
172
tice (DJJ) shall recommend a disposition to the court. In E.A.R. v. State,
the issue before the Supreme Court of Florida was whether the juvenile court
must "justify departures from the Department of Juvenile Justice's (DJJ)
recommended dispositions by explaining a judge's 'reasons' for a departure."'' 74 It must do so in terms of the "characteristics of the imposed restrictiveness level" under the Florida Statutes as compared to "the rehabilitative
needs of the child.' 75 In a lengthy opinion, including a detailed exposition
of the particular case before the Court, and with a strong dissent with two
concurrences, the Court set out a test by which the juvenile court should
"provide 'reasons' that explain, support, and justify why one restrictiveness
level is more appropriate than another and thereby rationalize a departure
disposition.' 76 The Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court
should:
Articulate an understanding of the respective characteristics of the
opposing restrictiveness levels including (but not limited to) the
type of child that each restrictiveness level is designed to serve,
potential "lengths of stay" associated with each level, and the divergent treatment programs and services available to the juvenile
at these levels; and [tihen logically and persuasively explain why,
in light of these differing characteristics, one level is better suited
to serving both the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile-in the least
restrictive setting-and maintaining the ability of
the State to pro177
tect the public from further acts of delinquency.
M.J.S. v. State78 and D.B. v. State 179 are cases the district courts of appeal decided after the opinion in E.A.R. M.J.S. described the opinion in
E.A.R. as "a new, more rigorous analysis in which a trial court must engage
before departing from the DJJ's recommendation."' 80 In D.B., the trial court
failed to comply8 with the new standard and thus the appellate court reversed
and remanded.' '

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See FLA.

STAT.

§ 985.03(21); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.115.

4 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2009).
Id. at 616-17 (internal footnote omitted).
Id. at 617.
Id. at 638.
Id.
6 So. 3d 1268 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
12 So. 3d 875 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
M.J.S., 6 So. 3d 12 at 1269.
D.B., 12 So. 3d at 876.

2009 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW

20091

In Florida, secure detention either pretrial or after adjudication, is specifically controlled by statute.182 When trial judges act in contravention of
the time frames set forth in the statute, writs of habeas corpus are taken seeking discharge. 83 In M.A.M. v. Vurro,' 84 a juvenile sought relief arguing that
he could not be held in secure detention under the twenty-one day rule found
in Florida law. 185 A situation in which a child who might "not otherwise
meet the secure detention criteria" may be held in secure detention is when
the court makes certain findings "that respite care is unavailable and that
secure detention is required to prevent victim injury.' 86 The appellate court
in M.A.M. concluded that under Florida law, the court may not order "a child
charged with domestic violence [to] be held in secure detention for more
not be used
than twenty-one days in total.' 87 The two separate sections may
89
in combination. 88 On this ground, the court granted the writ.
Where a child in a delinquency case is incompetent to proceed, after a
hearing, the court may order the child placed in a secure residential facility.' 9° Thus, the finding of involuntary commitment requires clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood that the child would
inflict serious bodily harm on himself or others.' 9' This was the issue in
A.L.M. v. Department of Children & Families.9 2 The child sought certiorari
and habeas corpus relief from the order committing him to DCF under the
secure placement statute. 193 The appellate court reviewed the facts of the
case finding that, "[a]lthough three psychologists testified, their testimony
did not support, by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court's finding
that . . . there was a 'substantial likelihood' of infliction of serious bodily
harm by the child upon himself or others. 194 The court thus granted the
writ. 195
It would appear obvious that a juvenile delinquency case is not a matter
in which a child is described as a criminal, nor one in which the child is con182.
183.
184.
185.

See FLA. STAT. §§ 985.24(1), .245(1), .25, .255 (2009).
See, e.g., M.A.M. v. Vurro, 2 So. 3d 388, 389 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
2 So. 3d 388 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 389.
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Id. at 390;

FLA. STAT.

§ 985.255(2).

187. M.A.M., 2 So. 3d at 390.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 390-91.
190. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.095.

§ 985.19(3).

191.

See FLA.

192.
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194.
195.

995 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 1085.
Id. at 1086.
Id.
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victed of a crime.'96 Nonetheless, in D.A. v. State, 197 a child was obligated to
appeal from a trial order imposing the cost of prosecution pursuant to the
criminal law cost payment statute in Florida. 198 The appellate court reversed,
pointing to the variety of provisions in the Florida Juvenile Delinquency Statute and case law that stand for the proposition that an adjudicated delinquent
has not been convicted and is not a criminal.' 9 9 Conditions of probation are
among the dispositional alternatives the court may impose upon a child.2"
The issue in J.W.J. v. State20 1 was whether special conditions of probation
were both orally announced and whether they were permissible.2 °2 The court
in J.W.J. held that where the special condition of probation is statutorily authorized, there is no obligation to orally announce the condition.0 3 The court
reversed in part based upon the state's concession that certain aspects of the
special condition did not comply with state law or were not orally pronounced.2°
The dispositional alternative of restitution comes up regularly in the appellate courts in substantial numbers despite the fact that the matter is one of
statutory construction. 2 05 In J.C. v. State2° the order of restitution dealt with
the theft of four pocket bikes from a store owner.0 7 On appeal, the child
argued that the owner "purchased the bikes wholesale and could not sell
them at their marked retail prices [and therefore] restitution should [be] limited to the wholesale price. '20 8 The appellate court affirmed, finding "that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the bikes at a discounted
retail price. '2 °9
A juvenile appealed a restitution award claiming that it should be reversed because it included the amount "for a purse, three pairs of sunglasses,
and sixty CDs," in G.P. v. State.21 0 Apparently, the petition for delinquency
196. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
197. 11 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
198. Id. at 423; see FLA. STAT. § 938.27(1) (2009).
199. D.A., 1ISo. 3d at 423-24 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.35(6); A.M.P. v. State, 927 So. 2d
97, 100 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
200. See FLA. STAT. § 985.435.
201. 994 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
202. Id. at 1224.
203. Id. at 1226.
204. Id. at 1227.
205. See Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 378-79; Dale, 2005-2006 Survey,
supra note 77, at 590-91.
206. 3 So. 3d 346 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
207. Id. at 346.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 996 So. 2d 920, 921 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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charged the child with "theft of miscellaneous jewelry and/or clothing" but
did not list the particular items in the charging document.21 Finding that the
jewelry and clothing may be included in the term miscellaneous jewelry
and/or clothing but that the CDs could not, the court held that the latter could
not be contained in the restitution award.212
Finally, in J.A.B. v. State,213 the child appealed an order requiring restitution "in the amount of $1479.09 at the rate of $50 per month, commencing
on a specified date approximately four months after the entry of the restitution order. ' 21 4 The child's argument on appeal was that the "court abused its
discretion in setting the amount and payment schedule for restitution. 2 5 In
J.A.B., the appellate court sitting en banc, and receding from prior opinions
in that district, ruled that a "trial court may set the restitution amount and
payments in a reasonable amount based upon evidence [showing] the earnings [that] the [child] may reasonably be expected to make., 216 The court
may also "set a commencement date for the payments so long as the court
provides a reasonable amount of time for the [child] to obtain employment. '2 17 In so doing, the court in J.A.B. noted the conflict with the First
J.A.M. v. State.218 On this basis, the
District Court of Appeal decision in
219
conflict.
the
certified
court in J.A.B.
VI.

OTHER MATTERS

Several changes in the FloridaStatutes in 2009 require brief discussion.
Section 39.0016 was amended to provide dependency courts and district
school superintendents with the ability to appoint surrogate parents for children under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 220 Under Florida
law, where the child is suspected of having special education needs and
where a parent cannot be located, the responsibilities of the surrogate parent
under the federal law must be implemented.22'

211.
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216.
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Id.
Id.
993 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (en banc).
Id. at 1150.
Id. at !151.
Id.
Id.
601 So. 2d 278, 278-79 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam).
J.A.B., 993 So. 2d at 1155.
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Act effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-35, 2009 Fla. Laws 319 (codified as amended in
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Chapter 39 has been amended by adding the "Give Grandparents and
Other Relatives a Voice Act" which ensures that relatives are to be provided
with notice of all dependency hearings and proceedings. 2 Chapter 39 also
has been amended to require the court to ask the parent's consent to provide
access to a child's medical and educational records, and to provide that information to the court, the lead community agency (CBC), the guardian ad
litem, and any attorneys for the child.223 If the parent cannot do so or is unwilling to do so, the court may issue an order granting access. 24
Significantly, Florida law was also changed to have the CBC and the
local education agency work together to see to it that a child remain in the
school where he or she was enrolled at the time of placement in the child
welfare system, a matter that has first been institutionalized in Broward
County in the settlement of a federal lawsuit in 2000.25
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Florida decided one significant case in the delinquency area explaining the test by which a trial court determines that it shall
override a dispositional recommendation of the State Department of Juvenile
Justice.226 The state's intermediate appellate courts, on the other hand, were
quite busy ruling in dependency, termination of parental rights, and delinquency cases on a number of statutory issues. In two cases, one involving
the interpretation of the delinquency restitution statute and the other involving ineffective assistance of counsel in termination of parental rights cases,
the appellate courts suggested that the Supreme Court of Florida should resolve those issues. 2 7

222. Zahid Jones, Jr., Give Grandparents and Other Relatives a Voice Act, ch. 2009-43,
2009 Fla. Laws 343-44, 348 (codified as amended in scattered sections of chapter 39 of FLA.
STAT.).

223. Ch. 2009-35 Fla. Laws at 322.
224. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(1).
225. Ch. 2009-35 Fla. Laws at 323; Order Approving Settlement Agreement, Ward v.
Kearney, No. 98-7137- Civ-Moreno (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2000).
226. E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614, 616-17 (Fla. 2009).
227. See, e.g., L.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families., 995 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2008).

